Michael Gaynor
January 14, 2006
Alito, Arroyo, and Hitchcock: Supremes may turn back the clock
By Michael Gaynor

Sometimes the United States Supreme Court makes a mistake of a constitutional nature that has monumental and horrific consequences. The Supremes are supposed to correct such a mistake as soon as it is appreciated and the opportunity to correct it is presented. One such mistake was Plessy v. Ferguson (May 18, 1896), in which the Supremes, 8 to 1, disregarded the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and tortured and twisted the Fourteenth Amendment to permit "separate but equal" (although separate was inherently unequal). It took 58 years for the Supremes to correct that one, in Brown v. Board of Education (May 17, 1954), unanimously. The magic words "stare decisis" were not successfully invoked to perpetuate segregation forever, because, unlike lower court judges, the Supremes are not bound by it, because they are supposed to correct their own mistakes instead of blithely disregard them as "settled law." Settled law is settled law until it is unsettled.

There are still two horrendous United States Supreme Court mistakes that need to be rectified as quickly as possible: (1) the declaration in Everson v. Board of Education (1947) that government is to be neutral as between religion and irreligion and not to support religion generally, and (2) the creation in Roe v. Wade (1973) of a constitutional right to abortion, depriving each state of its right under the Constitution to regulate abortion.

In a footnote to his irrefutable dissent in the infamous Kentucky Ten Commandments case, Justice Antonin Scalia not only lamented the insidious effect of Everson, but its speciousness:

"The fountainhead of this jurisprudence, Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, based its dictum that '[n]either a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which . . . aid all religions,' 330 U.S., at 15, on a review of historical evidence that focused on the debate leading up to the passage of the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, see id., at 11–13. A prominent commentator of the time remarked (after a thorough review of the evidence himself) that it appeared the Court had been 'sold . . . a bill of goods.' Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law & Contemp. Prob. 3, 16 (1949)."

Secular extremists have been selling that bill of goods for a long time.

We need a few more United States Supreme Court Justices who are more God-fearing and less gullible.

Samuel A. Alito, Jr. is an experienced federal appellate court judge on the verge of replacing Justice Sandra Day O'Connor as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme court, thanks to President Bush's decision to nominate him, his own stellar credentials and personal integrity, his judicious testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the virtually unanimous support of those who know him (covering a broad swath of the political spectrum), the disgusting tactics of his secular extremist/pro-abortion opponents, the backfiring of Senator Kennedy's vile insinuation that he (Judge Alito) is a bigot, and the skillful and strenuous efforts of supporters of strict construction (for example, the Judicial Confirmation Network and the Third Branch Conference) to be thoroughly prepared instead of taken by surprise, so that Judge Alito would not be "borked," as the shameless secular extremist/abortion on demand forever minority planned and tried strenuously to do.

Raymond Arroyo is the News Director of the Eternal Word Television Network (EWTN); lead anchor and host of "The World Over," EWTN's weekly one-hour news and interview program; the author of the new bestselling book on the life and work of Mother Angelica, the foundress of EWTN (Mother Angelica: The Remarkable Story of a Nun, Her Nerve, and a Network of Miracles); a New Orleans native dislocated as a result of Hurricane Katrina; and one of the foremost and highly respected Catholic journalists in the country.

Dr. James Hitchcock is professor of history at St. Louis University; an author, lecturer and columnist who focuses on current events in the Roman Catholic Church and in the world; author of The Supreme Court and Religion in American Life, Vol. I The Odyssey of the Religion Clauses and Vol.II From 'Higher Law' to 'Sectarian Scruples,' published in 2004; and the guest on the January 13, 2006 "The World Over" show, which focused on the Alito nomination and religious liberty.

Russell Hittinger, in First Things, described Dr. Hitchcock's masterpiece this way: "The Supreme Court and Religion in American Life provides for the general reader a useful road map through the history and case law. The first of the two volumes tells the history rather comprehensively, with a minimum of interpretive overlay. The second tries to understand the story. Hitchcock's work is especially valuable for his extensive coverage of the Court's religion jurisprudence before the deluge — that is, before the 1940s, when the Court deliberately made itself a tribunal of the nation's religious disputes."

If Suffolk County, Long Island, New York (where I live) is typical, it is tragic that secular extremists pick the books for public libraries. There is ONE set in the entire County library system in a large and well populated country with many public library. Fortunately, that set was in a library near my home, so I was able to review it before the show. it is anathema to secular extremists, because it describes in a clear, concise. compelling and authoritative way how the United States Supreme Court suddenly ignored America's religious heritage and the well understood meaning of the religious clauses of the First Amendment to transform in the eyes of America's civil law governmental recognition of God and support for religion generally as constitutionally prohibited. Even though the First Amendment had not been amended since it was ratified in 1791 and America's preeminent United States Supreme Court Justices (Chief Justice John Marshall and Associate Justice Joseph Story), premier nineteenth century legal commentators (Justice Story and Thomas Cooley, and the Senate and House Judiciary Committees that studied the First Amendment before the Civil War were unanimously to the contrary.

In the words of Chief Justice Marshall: "[W]ith us Christianity and Religion are identified. It would be strange indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose Christianity, and did not often refer to it, and exhibit relations to it."

The secular extremists tried to end the military chaplaincy during the nineteenth century. But both houses of Congress studied the matter carefully and rejected the secular extremist position in the clearest possible terms.

The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report explaining the establishment clause:

"The clause speaks of 'an establishment of religion.' What is meant by that expression? It referred, without doubt, to the establishment which existed in the mother country, its meaning is to be ascertained by ascertaining what that establishment was. It was the connection with the state of a particular religious society, by its endowment, at public expense, in exclusion of, or in preference to, any other, by giving to its member's exclusive political rights, and by compelling the attendance of those who rejected its communion upon its worship, or religious observances. These three particulars constituted that union of church and state of which our ancestors were so justly jealous, and against which they so wisely and carefully provided...."

The report further stated that the Founders were "utterly opposed to any constraint upon the rights of conscience" and therefore they opposed the establishment of a religion in the same manner that the Church of England was established.

But, the Founders "had no fear or jealousy of religion itself, nor did they wish to see us an irreligious people....They did not intend to spread over all the public authorities and the whole public action of the nation the dead and revolting spectacle of 'atheistic apathy.' Not so had the battles of the revolution been fought, and the deliberations of the revolutionary Congress conducted."

A similar House Judiciary Committee report explained that "an establishment of religion" was a term of art with a specific meaning:

"What is an establishment of religion? It must have a creed, defining what a man must believe; it must have rights and ordinances, which believers must observe; it must have ministers of defined qualifications, to teach the doctrines and administer the rites; it must have tests for the submissive, and penalties for the nonconformist. There never was an establishment of religion without all these."

After World War II, however, the United States Supreme Court arbitrarily extended the First Amendment's establishment clause, by judicial invention, to separate church and state in a way that inhibits the free exercise of religion required by the First Amendment's free exercise clause but provides freedom from religion to the unreligious minority. THAT surely was not contemplated by the men who drafted and ratified the Constitution and the First Amendment, and would not have been comprehensible to them.

The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist rightly asserted in dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) that the establishment clause was intended only to stop the federal government from establishing a national church or preferring one sect over another, and certainly not to require governmental neutrality between religion and "irreligion."

Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas recognize that too. As strict constructionists, now Chief Justice John Roberts and Judge Alito know that too.

Sadly, Justice O'Connor put aside her strict constructionism when it came to religious liberty and abortion. Justice O'Connor voted with the late Chief Justice Rehnquist more than with any other Justice (80% of the time), but not in establishment clause and abortion cases, abandoning strict constructionism selectively.

Justice O'Connor distinguished herself last June by writing a brilliant and irrefutable dissent in the Kelo case (joined by the late Chief Justice Rehnquists and Justices Scalia and Thomas) that warms the hearts of strict constructionists and originalists who regret that she ever set aside devotion to original intent manifested in her inspired and inspiring dissenting opinion and kowtowed to the secular extremist judicial coup by which the idiosyncratic sensibilities of secular extremists were exalted over what George Washington called "the duty of all Nations to acknowledge the providence of almighty God, to obey his will, to be grateful for his benefits, and humbly to implore his protection and favor...."

Justice O'Connor simultaneously showed her usual strict constructionists colors and the inconsistency with them of her votes on establishment clause and abortion cases by writing as follows:

"Over two centuries ago, just after the Bill of Rights was ratified, Justice Chase wrote: 'An act of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority ... . A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean... . [A] law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with such powers; and, therefore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.' Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 388 (1798) (emphasis deleted). "Today the Court abandons this long-held, basic limitation on government power. Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private owner, so long as it might be upgraded — i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public — in the process. To reason, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits resulting from the subsequent ordinary use of private property render economic development takings "for public use" is to wash out any distinction between private and public use of property — and thereby effectively to delete the words "for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly I respectfully dissent." Secular extremists/pro-abortionists who laud Justice O'Connor for siding with them DO have reason to fear that Judge Alito will not make exceptions for their special interests to his general strict constructionist judicial philosophy. It does not appear that he either personally believes abortion is morally right (they want only justices who believe the contrary), or that he is attracted by the thought of becoming "the swing vote" or pandering to them in order to be praised in Far leftist circles for "intellectual evolution." It sure looks like Judge Alito, as a Supreme, will decide cases on their merits, as they come before him, without ignoring the value of precedent or being hamstrung by it, because his oath under Article VI of the Constitution requires him to support the Constitution and not to accept precedent automatically. Stare decisis is Latin for "judicial excuse to pretend wrong was right." Not exactly, of course. The definitions of legal phrases are rarely that simple. But that is the gist of the judicial doctrine known as stare decisis. The established definition is: "To stand by decided cases, to follow precedent. A flexible doctrine of Anglo-American law that when a court expressly decides an issue of law, which is generated by the facts of a unique dispute, that decision shall constitute a precedent which should be followed by that court and by courts inferior to it, when deciding future disputes, except when the precedent's application to a particular problem case is unsuitable to the character or spirit of the people of the state or nation, and their current social, political and economic conditions."

To appreciate leftist hypocrisy, it is helpful to examine the history of sodomy law. In 1986, in Bowers v. Hartwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the United States Supreme Court ruled, 5-4 , that Georgia's law banning consensual sodomy did not violate privacy rights. In 2003, in Lawrence v. Texas, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter joined in the majority opinion and Justice O'Connor concurred in the result to ban sodomy laws. The Bowers Court had determined that "condemnation of these (homosexual) practices is firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards." 478 U.S. at 196. The Lawrence majority took a different view:

"It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. 'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.' Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992)."

Stare decisis received lip service, of course, but it was not an immovable obstacle to the majority overruling Bowers:

"The doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law. It is not, however, an inexorable command. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ('Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision"') (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940))). In Casey we noted that when a Court is asked to overrule a precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions with particular strength against reversing course. 505 U.S., at 855–856; see also id., at 844 ('Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt'). The holding in Bowers, however, has not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some instances where recognized individual rights are involved. Indeed, there has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort that could counsel against overturning its holding once there are compelling reasons to do so. Bowers itself causes uncertainty, for the precedents before and after its issuance contradict its central holding.

"The rationale of Bowers does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens came to these conclusions:

'Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second, individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.' 478 U.S., at 216 (footnotes and citations omitted).

"Justice Stevens' analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and should control here.

"Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled."

So much for stare decisis (at least when the original decision had a moral component).

The dissenting opinion by Justice Scalia, joined in by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, exposed both the hypocrisy and the slipperiness of the majority opinion:

"'Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.' Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). That was the Court's sententious response, barely more than a decade ago, to those seeking to overrule Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court's response today, to those who have engaged in a 17-year crusade to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), is very different. The need for stability and certainty presents no barrier."

All of which means that settled law is settled law until it is unsettled!

The dissenting opinion then proceeded to lawyers' version of "inside baseball," pointing out that (1) most of the majority opinion had "no relevance to its actual holding — that the Texas statute 'furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify' its application to petitioners under rational-basis review," thereby "overruling Bowers to the extent it sustained Georgia's anti-sodomy statute under the rational-basis test," and (2), notwithstanding "discussion of 'fundamental proposition[s],'...and 'fundamental decisions,'... nowhere does the Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a 'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a "'fundamental right."'"

An important, generally unappreciated point: "while overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely untouched its central legal conclusion: '[R]espondent would have us announce ... a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do.' 478 U.S., at 191. Instead the Court simply describes petitioners' conduct as 'an exercise of their liberty' — which it undoubtedly is — and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case."

The dissenters, no slaves to bad precedent, chided members of the majority for their obvious inconsistency and urged the consistency that fair-minded Americans expect of their courts:

" I begin with the Court's surprising readiness to reconsider a decision rendered a mere 17 years ago in Bowers v. Hardwick. I do not myself believe in rigid adherence to stare decisis in constitutional cases; but I do believe that we should be consistent rather than manipulative in invoking the doctrine. Today's opinions in support of reversal do not bother to distinguish — or indeed, even bother to mention — the paean to stare decisis coauthored by three Members of today's majority in Planned Parenthood v. Casey. There, when stare decisis meant preservation of judicially invented abortion rights, the widespread criticism of Roe was strong reason to reaffirm it:

'Where, in the performance of its judicial duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe[,] ... its decision has a dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry... . [T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason ... would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.' 505 U.S., at 866–867.

"Today, however, the widespread opposition to Bowers, a decision resolving an issue as 'intensely divisive' as the issue in Roe, is offered as a reason in favor of overruling it. See ante, at 15–16. Gone, too, is any 'enquiry' (of the sort conducted in Casey) into whether the decision sought to be overruled has 'proven 'unworkable,"' Casey, supra, at 855."

The dissenters then pointed out how far the majority had gone to achieve a result:

"Today's approach to stare decisis invites us to overrule an erroneously decided precedent (including an 'intensely divisive' decision) if: (1) its foundations have been 'eroded' by subsequent decisions...(2) it has been subject to "substantial and continuing" criticism...; and (3) it has not induced 'individual or societal reliance' that counsels against overturning.... The problem is that Roe itself — which today's majority surely has no disposition to overrule — satisfies these conditions to at least the same degree as Bowers."

Plainly, the overruling of Bowers invites the overruling of Roe, when five votes are available:

"What a massive disruption of the current social order...the overruling of Bowers entails. Not so the overruling of Roe, which would simply have restored the regime that existed for centuries before 1973, in which the permissibility of and restrictions upon abortion were determined legislatively State-by-State."

And the dissenters dismissed the majority's novel, but unpersuasive, reliance argument to keep Roe in place forever:

"Casey...chose to base its stare decisis determination on a different 'sort' of reliance. '[P]eople,' it said, 'have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail." 505 U.S., at 856. This falsely assumes that the consequence of overruling Roe would have been to make abortion unlawful. It would not; it would merely have permitted the States to do so. Many States would unquestionably have declined to prohibit abortion, and others would not have prohibited it within six months (after which the most significant reliance interests would have expired). Even for persons in States other than these, the choice would not have been between abortion and childbirth, but between abortion nearby and abortion in a neighboring State."

In addition, the dissenters emphasized the majority's expediency:

"To tell the truth, it does not surprise me, and should surprise no one, that the Court has chosen today to revise the standards of stare decisis set forth in Casey. It has thereby exposed Casey's extraordinary deference to precedent for the result-oriented expedient that it is."

A result-oriented expedient that presaged the majority's erroneous conclusion that the Texas sodomy statute the majority chose to invalidate lacked a rational basis.

The disgusted dissenters deemed that deplorable, albeit politely:

"This proposition is so out of accord with our jurisprudence — indeed, with the jurisprudence of any society we know — that it requires little discussion.

"The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are 'immoral and unacceptable,' Bowers, supra, at 196 — the same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity. Bowers held that this was a legitimate state interest. The Court today reaches the opposite conclusion. The Texas statute, it says, 'furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual,' ante, at 18 (emphasis added). The Court embraces instead Justice Stevens' declaration in his Bowers dissent, that 'the fact that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice,' ante, at 17. This effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation. If, as the Court asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive rational-basis review."

Great news for fornicators, bigamists (and polygamists), adulterers, practitioners of adult incest, bestiality enthusiasts (if not their abused partners), and providers and users of obscenity!

The dissenters diagnosed the majority opinion as "the product of a Court, which is the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the...agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct" and taking "sides in the culture war, departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules of engagement are observed."

The dissenters fittingly concluded with a principled statement of the limited role of the judiciary recognized by strict constructionists and rejected by judicial activists:

"[P]ersuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I would no more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts — or, for that matter, display any moral disapprobation of them — than I would forbid it to do so. What Texas has chosen to do is well within the range of traditional democratic action, and its hand should not be stayed through the invention of a brand-new 'constitutional right' by a Court that is impatient of democratic change. It is indeed true that 'later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress,' ante, at 18; and when that happens, later generations can repeal those laws. But it is the premise of our system that those judgments are to be made by the people, and not imposed by a governing caste that knows best.

"One of the benefits of leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion. The people may feel that their disapprobation of homosexual conduct is strong enough to disallow homosexual marriage, but not strong enough to criminalize private homosexual acts — and may legislate accordingly. The Court today pretends that it possesses a similar freedom of action, so that that we need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently occurred in Canada (in a decision that the Canadian Government has chosen not to appeal)....At the end of its opinion — after having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis jurisprudence — the Court says that the present case 'does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter'....Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes the constitutional protections afforded to 'personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,' and then declares that '[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.' Ante, at 13 (emphasis added). Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral disapprobation of homosexual conduct is 'no legitimate state interest' for purposes of proscribing that conduct, ante, at 18; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), '[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,' ante, at 6; what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising '[t]he liberty protected by the Constitution,' ibid.? Surely not the encouragement of procreation, since the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry. This case 'does not involve' the issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court comfortingly assures us, this is so.

"The matters appropriate for this Court's resolution are only three: Texas's prohibition of sodomy neither infringes a "fundamental right" (which the Court does not dispute), nor is unsupported by a rational relation to what the Constitution considers a legitimate state interest, nor denies the equal protection of the laws. I dissent."

Significantly, Justice Thomas filed a brief dissent expressing a personal opinion and acknowledging that not even a United States Supreme Court Justice is supposed to exalt personal opinion above the Constitution (and pretend to be interpreting the Constitution instead of exalting);

"I join Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that the law before the Court today 'is ... uncommonly silly.' Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal it. Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement resources.

"Notwithstanding this, I recognize that as a member of this Court I am not empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situated. My duty, rather, is to 'decide cases "agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States."' Id., at 530. And, just like Justice Stewart, I 'can find [neither in the Bill of Rights nor any other part of the Constitution a] general right of privacy,' ibid., or as the Court terms it today, the 'liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions,' ante, at 1."

The secular extremist left will do whatever it can to preserve the perversions of the Constitution perpetrated by judicial activists as well as to press for more. So it is imperative that their judicial coups be recognized for precisely what they were and undone as soon as possible.

Mr. Arroyo read Dr. Hitchcock this emailed question:

Is the U.S. Supreme Court somehow entitled to interpret the religious clauses of the First Amendment in such a way as to supersede "the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God" recognized in the Declaration of Independence and to alienate "certain unalienable Rights, ...among these... Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness" asserted in the Declaration instead of "secur[ing] these rights" as the Declaration expressly contemplated?

Dr. Hitchcock answered no, of course, and then explained in some detail why not.

For those and other reasons, the deplorable Everson declaration on the status of religion under the Constitution should be revisited and revised.

Dr. Hitchcock acknowledged that the word God does not appear in the Constitution, but that fact is deceiving. Both the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation were explicitly dated in the year of our Lord. (That's a reference to Jesus, reflecting not only America's belief in God, but in Christianity). Moreover, the Constitution speaks of securing Blessings in its preamble and swearing (or affirming) and excepting Sundays in counting days in which to veto in its text. Secular extremists delight in calling the Constitution a godless document, but it certainly is not.

The time is approaching when the secular extremists ' judicial coup under the guise of judicial construction will be reversed. THAT is why, by secular extremists/pro-abortionists and their pawns, Judge Alito and his Supreme Court nomination and pending confirmation have been baselessly and contemptibly criticized and brazenly and crudely cursed.

© Michael Gaynor

 

The views expressed by RenewAmerica columnists are their own and do not necessarily reflect the position of RenewAmerica or its affiliates.
(See RenewAmerica's publishing standards.)

Click to enlarge

Michael Gaynor

Michael J. Gaynor has been practicing law in New York since 1973. A former partner at Fulton, Duncombe & Rowe and Gaynor & Bass, he is a solo practitioner admitted to practice in New York state and federal courts and an Association of the Bar of the City of New York member... (more)

Subscribe

Receive future articles by Michael Gaynor: Click here

Latest articles

April 13, 2016
Former SCOTUS clerks Wendy Long v. Gregory Diskant disagree about the Senate's advice and consent power


April 11, 2016
Krauthammer's personal disdain for Trump skewed his view of Wisconsin primary results a bit


April 4, 2016
Sensitive Megyn Kelly disses fellow Fox News stars


March 31, 2016
Megyn Kelly ignores key facts to champion faux victim Michelle Fields' bogus criminal battery charge


March 22, 2016
Glenn Beck's pathetic attention-seeking open letter to Donald Trump


March 17, 2016
Trump wins 5 of 6, Cruz loses 6 and helps Kasich finally win one by underperforming


March 14, 2016
Shame on Trump's Republican rivals for blaming his campaign for the violence in Chicago


March 12, 2016
To Fox News: Give Sean Hannity the 9 PM slot back and focus on presidential eligibility


March 10, 2016
New York Times' David Brooks rejected as Donald Trump triumphs yet again


March 7, 2016
"True conservatives" support Donald Trump, because Clinton judicial appointments would "fundamentally transform" the United States notwithstanding the Constitution instead of making it great again


More articles

 

Alan Keyes
Why de facto government (tyranny) is replacing the Constitution (Apr. 2015)

Stephen Stone
Will Obama be impeached now that Republicans control both houses of Congress? (Nov. 2014)

Cliff Kincaid
Cruz thwarts hostile takeover of the GOP

Gina Miller
Truth about MS Religious Freedom Protection Act

Susan D. Harris
It's the little things: Remembering Western Civilization

Tom DeWeese
Time to make candidates face the real issues threatening American freedom

Jerry Newcombe
The high price of freedom

Lloyd Marcus
Bill Clinton: 'Bout time Dems tell the truth about BLM

Bryan Fischer
Bruce Springsteen and Bryan Adams: hypocrites and bigots

Judie Brown
Aborted babies incinerated?

Jim Kouri
State Dept. finally turns over Huma Abedin/Susan Rice Benghazi files

Michael Gaynor
Former SCOTUS clerks Wendy Long v. Gregory Diskant disagree about the Senate's advice and consent power

A.J. Castellitto
A new way to be human

Cliff Kincaid
Who is the biggest demagogue of them all?
  More columns

Cartoons


Michael Ramirez
More cartoons

RSS feeds

News:
Columns:

Columnists

Matt C. Abbott
Chris Adamo
Russ J. Alan
Bonnie Alba
Jamie Freeze Baird
Chuck Baldwin
Kevin J. Banet
J. Matt Barber
. . .
[See more]

Sister sites