Jim Kouri
Should US State Department curtail anti-drug funding?
By Jim Kouri
The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, the State Department's Office of Aviation has maintained aircraft and provided support for the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police. However, eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground requiring helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each mission. In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of coca, a record amount.
In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But in late 2002 and during 2003, the number of hits increased — peaking at 73 in January 2003 and averaging more than 26 per month — and, in 2003, two spray aircraft crashed and two were forced to land because of ground fire.
Moreover, the number of flying hours for spray aircraft more than doubled — from about 5,450 hours in 2001 to over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant the aircraft were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire, although other factors came into play. In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation gunships that already accompanied every mission.
Also, since January 2003, the State Department has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents' proximity to spray targets. Since fiscal year 2001, State has significantly increased resources for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding for the program doubled from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100 million for fiscal year 2003.
In addition, from fiscal year 2001 to May 2004, personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with the program increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft increased from 22 to 35. However, State does not prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements. Consequently, State often moves funds from one program to another, which may adversely affect those programs. In addition, State does not plan for the longterm costs of the aerial eradication program, such as aircraft replacement. As a result, State has postponed requesting funds for new aircraft.
Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be sustainable. For example, projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families.
U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups has provided support to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to longer-term development assistance.
Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining nonmilitary assistance efforts. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Justice have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector.
Sources: Government Accounting Office, US Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, National Security Institute, National Association of Chiefs of Police
© Jim Kouri
The Department of State supports foreign governments' efforts to eradicate illicit drug crops. In recent years, the State Department's Office of Aviation has maintained aircraft and provided support for the aerial eradication program of the Colombian National Police. However, eradication aircraft are often shot at from the ground requiring helicopter gunships and a search and rescue helicopter to accompany each mission. In 2003, the Office of Aviation fumigated more than 132,000 hectares of coca, a record amount.
In 2001 and most of 2002, the number of ground-fire hits on spray aircraft averaged fewer than 10 per month. But in late 2002 and during 2003, the number of hits increased — peaking at 73 in January 2003 and averaging more than 26 per month — and, in 2003, two spray aircraft crashed and two were forced to land because of ground fire.
Moreover, the number of flying hours for spray aircraft more than doubled — from about 5,450 hours in 2001 to over 11,300 hours in 2003. In general, this meant the aircraft were exposed more frequently to the threat of ground fire, although other factors came into play. In response to the increased number of ground-fire hits, the Colombian National Police began providing two or three helicopter gunships for each eradication mission; this was in addition to the two Office of Aviation gunships that already accompanied every mission.
Also, since January 2003, the State Department has taken several actions to help reduce exposure to the threat of ground fire by making greater use of information about armed insurgents' proximity to spray targets. Since fiscal year 2001, State has significantly increased resources for the aerial eradication program in Colombia. Funding for the program doubled from about $49 million in fiscal year 2001 to $100 million for fiscal year 2003.
In addition, from fiscal year 2001 to May 2004, personnel in Colombia who were directly involved with the program increased from 179 to 298, and the number of aerial eradication aircraft increased from 22 to 35. However, State does not prepare budgets that address all of the Office of Aviation's program requirements. Consequently, State often moves funds from one program to another, which may adversely affect those programs. In addition, State does not plan for the longterm costs of the aerial eradication program, such as aircraft replacement. As a result, State has postponed requesting funds for new aircraft.
Although U.S. nonmilitary assistance programs have begun to produce some results, individual projects reach a relatively small number of beneficiaries, face implementation challenges, and may not be sustainable. For example, projects designed to promote legitimate economic alternatives to illicit crop cultivation have helped about 33,400 families.
U.S. assistance to Colombia's vulnerable groups has provided support to many internally displaced persons, but these program beneficiaries do not receive all of the assistance they need, and there is no systematic way for beneficiaries to transition from emergency aid to longer-term development assistance.
Colombia and the United States continue to face long-standing management and financial challenges. The Colombian government's ability to contribute funds for nonmilitary assistance programs is limited by a number of domestic and foreign factors, and Colombia's longstanding conflict poses additional challenges to implementing and sustaining nonmilitary assistance efforts. Furthermore, the Departments of State and Justice have not established timelines for achieving their stated objectives, nor have State and USAID developed a strategy to turn programs over to the Colombian government or to the private sector.
Sources: Government Accounting Office, US Department of State, Drug Enforcement Administration, National Security Institute, National Association of Chiefs of Police
© Jim Kouri
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